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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
SHELLY HIPWELL, an individual
by and through her guardians,
SHERRIE JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

Supreme Court No. 920218
Priority No. 11

vs.
ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY,
and DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants/Appellants.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant
to Utah Const., art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(g)
and (j) (Supp. 1992).

The Third Judicial District Court denied

defendants/ motions for summary judgment on March 30, 1992 and
defendants' joint petition for permission to appeal the interlocutory order was granted by this Court on June 23, 1992.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the trial court err in concluding that the Amended Utah
Governmental Iinmunity Act does not validly limit the liability of
the University Hospital to $250,000? This is a legal determination
for which the Court gives no deference, but rather reviews for
correctness. Standard Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821
P.2d 1136, 1137 (Utah 1991).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
1.

Utah Const., art. I, §§7, 11, and 24.

2.

Utah Const., art V, § 1.

3.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-2(3),(4), and (9) (1989).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1966 and 1978).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a legal malpractice action against defen-

dants Roger Sharp and Tim Healy, plaintiffs/ former attorneys.
Plaintiffs retained Sharp and Healy to pursue a medical malpractice
claim against the University Medical Center, which includes the
University Hospital and the College of Medicine.

Sharp and Healy

subsequently

on plaintiffs'

behalf.

negotiated

a

$250,000

settlement

Plaintiffs later filed this action against defendants

Sharp and Healy

alleging

that the amount

of

the

settlement

negotiated by defendants was inadequate.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
$250,000 settlement was reasonable as a matter of law because the
alleged negligent act was performed by an agent of the College of
Medicine and, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA), the
liability of the College of Medicine is limited to $250,000.
Plaintiffs' opposing memorandum did not dispute the fact that the
College of Medicine's liability is limited to $250,000.
plaintiffs

asserted

that

the

University

Hospital

Instead,
was

also

negligent, and that the liability limit of $250,000 was declared to

2
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be unconstitutional by this court in Condemarin v. University
Hospital insofar as it pertained to the University Hospital.
Defendants responded to plaintiffs/ opposing memorandum by
asserting that, even if the University Hospital were negligent, its
liability is also limited to $250,000 because of a subsequent
amendment to the UGIA.

Defendants also suggested that inadequate

briefing by the parties in Condemarin may have led to an improper
result in that case.

Because plaintiffs chose not to contest the

liability limit of the College of Medicine, the central issue in
this motion became whether the liability of the University Hospital
is limited to $250,000. Defendants allowed plaintiffs to submit a
supplemental memorandum in order to fully address this primary
issue.
Although the trial court denied defendants7 motions, the court
nonetheless recognized that "the issue in dispute is pivotal and
dispositive."

The trial court further "urge[d] defendants to

pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their motions."
(R. 725). Defendants then petitioned for and received permission
to appeal the trial courts interlocutory order.
STATEMENTS OF FACT
1. In January of 1989, plaintiff Shelly Hipwell was injured
as a result of alleged negligent treatment at the University
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R. 5).

2. Plaintiffs Sherrie Jensen and Shayne Hipwell were duly
appointed to be the co-guardians of plaintiff Shelly Hipwell.

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R. 3).
3. Shelly Hipwell's guardians retained defendants Roger Sharp
and Tim Healy to pursue Shelley's claims against the University
Hospital and Medical Center.
4. Defendants

Sharp

(R. 6-7).
and

Healy

negotiated

a

$250,000

settlement which was paid by the State of Utah to Shelly Hipwell
and her co-guardians

(hereinafter collectively referred to as

"plaintiffs"). (R. 8).
5. Plaintiffs have subsequently filed suit against defendants
Sharp

and

inadequate.

Healy

claiming

that

the

$250,000

settlement

was

(R. 9-10).

6. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that
plaintiffs7 $250,000 settlement was reasonable as a matter of law
because the liability of the University Hospital is limited to
$250,000 under the 1987 version of the UGIA.

(R. 163, 165, 541).

7. The trial court denied defendants' motions for summary
judgment, concluding that the 1987 Act is unconstitutional "for the
reasons specified in plaintiffs' memoranda. . . . "
explanation was given.

No other

(R. 725).

8. Defendants have subsequently received permission from this
Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their
motions for summary judgment.
9. On

May

27,

1992,

(R. 730).
while

defendants'

petition

for

interlocutory appeal was pending, plaintiff Shelly Hipwell passed
away.

(R. 728).

4
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

$250,000

settlement

negotiated

by

defendants

on

plaintiffs' behalf is reasonable as a matter of law because the
liability of the University Hospital is limited to $250,000 under
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA).
Plaintiffs contest this fact by asserting that the liability
limit contained in the UGIA is unconstitutional insofar as it
pertains to the University Hospital.
plaintiffs

cite

to

this

University Hospital.

Court's

In support of this claim,
decision

in

Condemarin

v.

However, Condemarin does not affect the

outcome of this case for two reasons.
First, the Condemarin opinion was premised upon an erroneous
assumption that, under the common law, state hospitals were capable
of performing "proprietary functions" and were subject to suit for
torts arising out of those functions.

This led the Condemarin

plurality to believe that the 1978 UGIA purported to extend
immunity

to

the

function" rather

University

Hospital

than

"governmental

as

a

as

a

"non-governmental
function."

These

incorrect assumptions ultimately led to the incorrect conclusion
that the 1978 UGIA unconstitutionally limited the liability of the
University Hospital. Because of these errors, Condemarin should be
overruled and the liability cap reinstated.
Second, even if Condemarin is upheld, defendants are still
entitled to summary judgment because the 1987 amendment to the UGIA
remedied any constitutional defect that may have existed in the

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Act.

As it now stands, the 1987 UGIA is constitutional in every

respect and validly limits the liability of the University Hospital
to $250,000.

Consequently, the trial court erred in denying

defendants' motions for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
THE AMENDED UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
LEGALLY LIMITS THE LIABILITY OP THE UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL TO $250,000.
THUS, PLAINTIFFS'
$250,000 SETTLEMENT IS REASONABLE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that defendants were negligent
in settling plaintiffs' case for $250,000. Plaintiffs argue that,
while the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act

(UGIA)

limited the

liability of the University Hospital in the past, such limited
liability was found to be unconstitutional by this Court in
Condemarin v. University Hosp.. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).

In

contrast, defendants assert that Condemarin was decided in error
and that in any event the liability limit has been reinstated by
subsequent amendment of the UGIA.

Defendants further assert that

the liability limit in the amended Act is constitutional.
A.

HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN UTAH.
A correct understanding of the development of governmental

immunity in Utah is crucial to the outcome of this case.

For this

reason, the history of governmental immunity is set out below,
beginning with the status of governmental immunity at the time the
Utah Constitution was adopted.

6
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1.

At common law all state entities were absolutely immune
from
suit#
absent
consent
to
the
contrary.
Municipalities, on the other hand, were only granted
immunity for "governmental functions".

When the Utah Constitution was ratified, and continuing
thereafter, the common law provided that the state was absolutely
immune from suit, absent its statutory consent to the contrary:
In the absence of either express constitutional
or statutory authority an action against a
sovereign state cannot be maintained.
The
doctrine is elementary and of universal
application and so far as we are aware there is
not a single authority to the contrary,
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 492-93, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913)
(emphasis added).
This immunity extended to all subdivisions of the state:
If the result of the action is to appropriate
the state7s funds to satisfy the judgment
rendered in the action, the action is against
the state, regardless of its form or against
whom brought.
Id. at 630, 42 Utah at 493.
Apparently, all common law governmental immunity cases in Utah
have similarly recognized that state entities are absolutely immune
from suit, absent consent to the contrary.

See, e.g., State v.

District Court, Fourth Judic. Dist. . 94 Utah 384, 389, 78 P.2d 502,
504 (1937) ("The state cannot be sued unless it has given its
consent or has waived its immunity."); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State
Road Coram'n, 95 Utah 242, 249, 70 P.2d 857, 861 (1937) ("Action may
not be maintained [against the state] unless the state has, through
legislative or constitutional action, given consent to be sued.");

7
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Bingham v. Board of Educ. , 118 Utah 582, 592, 223 P.2d 432, 438
(1950) ("Under our constitution, the power to make departments of
the state respond in damages for torts rests with the legislature,
and without legislative enactment we are unable to impose any
liability. . . . " ) .
Standing in sharp contrast to the absolute immunity of the
state

is

the

partial

immunity

afforded

to

municipalities.

Municipalities are not afforded absolute immunity under the common
law because they are a hybrid of the state and a private corporation.

On the one hand, municipalities act as agents of the state

and perform many types of public or governmental functions. On the
other hand, a municipality is a private corporation capable of
acting in a private capacity.

In order to account for this dual

nature, the common law provides that a municipality can share in
the state's immunity only when it is acting as an agent of the
state

and

is

thereby

performing

a

public

or

"governmental

function." However, municipalities are not allowed to share in the
state's immunity when they are acting in their private capacities,
or rather are performing "proprietary functions:"
It has long been recognized in this jurisdiction
that a municipal corporation may act both in a
public and a private capacity and that when
performing in a public or governmental function
it is not subject to tort liability.
Ramirez v. Qgden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 104, 279 P.2d 463, 464 (1955)
(emphasis added).
In accordance with these principles, all common law govern-
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mental immunity cases involving municipalities have applied the
"governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction, which
distinction is not made in the cases involving state entities.
These cases are very careful to limit the application of the
"governmental

function"/"proprietary

function"

distinction

to

municipal entities:
The law in respect to the liability of municipal
corporations in discharging governmental or
public duties is well and tersely stated . . .
in the following language: 'The rule is general
that a municipal corporation is not liable for
alleged tortious injuries to the persons or
property of individuals, when engaged in the
performance of public or governmental functions
or duties. So far as municipal corporations
exercise powers conferred on them for purposes
essentially
public, they
stand
as does
sovereignty whose agents they are, and are not
liable to be sued for any act or omission
occurring while in the exercise of such powers,
unless by some statute the right of action be
given.'
Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 184, 89 P. 714, 715 (1907)
(emphasis added).

See also Ramirez v. Qgden City, 3 Utah 2d 102,

104-105, 279 P.2d 463, 464 (1955); Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100
Utah 573, 575, 111 P.2d 800, 801 (1941); Rollow v. Qgden City, 66
Utah 475, 481, 243 P. 791, 793 (1926); Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64
Utah 568, 569-70, 231 P. 1102, 1102-1103 (1924); Sehv v. Salt Lake
City, 41 Utah 535, 537, 126 P. 691 (1912).
As evidenced by the differing lines of cases involving state
and municipal entities, the "governmental function"/"proprietary
function" distinction applies only to municipalities at common law.
The distinction has never applied to state entities, which have
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always been absolutely immune from suit. By definition, the state
is the government and thus any action it performs is a "governmental function."

See Bingham v. Board of Educ. , 118 Utah 582,

587, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (1950) (the duties of state agencies are
"wholly governmental"); State v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo.
1985) (the activities of a state entity are "exclusively governmental functions. . . . " ) .
Numerous cases and articles have recognized the differing
treatment that is given to states and municipalities at common law,
including the Utah Law Review:
The Utah Supreme Court, early in its history
declared the immunity rule to be an elememtary
and universal principle and held that an ctction
against a sovereign state cannot be maintained
in the absence of express constitutional or
statutory authority.
The doctrine cannot be
circumvented by suing a state agency; the test
is that where a judgment would have to be
satisfied from state funds, there is in essence
an action against the state.
*

*

*

Municipal corporations do not fully partake of
the state7s immunity because of their peculiar
nature. They are on the one hand subdivisions
of the state exercising governmental powers, yet
on the other hand they engage in activities
similar to those of private corporations.
Because of this dual character, the immunity of
the state is extended to the municipality only
when it acts in a governmental capacity. Where
the municipal corporation acts in a private or
corporate capacity, it is liable for its torts.
This rule of law seems to be uniform throughout
the country. . . .
Note, Tort Claims Against the State of Utah, 5 Utah L. Rev. 233,
234 & 236-37 (1956) (emphasis added).
10
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This Court has similarly recognized the differing treatment
that was given to state entities and municipalities at common law,
as illustrated in Bingham v. Board of Educ. . 118 Utah 582, 223 P. 2d
432 (1950).
The plaintiff in Bingham was suing the Board of Education for
negligence and for nuisance.

The Board of Education claimed that

it was absolutely immune from suit as an agent of the state.

The

plaintiff asserted that the Board of Education was merely a
municipality and was thus subject to suit for torts it committed
during the performance of a "proprietary function."

Thus, the

issue faced by the Court was whether the Board of Education was a
state entity or a municipality.

This issue arose because, on the

one hand, the Board of Education had an independent existence as a
Utah corporation similar to a municipality, while on the other
hand, the board was founded, supervised, and controlled directly by
the state as are other state agencies.
This Court ultimately concluded that the Board of Education
was more like a state agency than a municipality.

The Court

referred to the board as a "quasi-municipal corporation" rather
than as an ordinary municipal

corporation.

The Court then

described in great detail the differing treatment that was given to
municipal corporations and "quasi-municipal corporations" (i.e.
state agencies) at common law:
The authorities seem to make a distinction
between municipal corporations and what are
termed "quasi-municipal" corporations.
This
distinction is better understood when consider11
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ation is given to the fact that school boards
are created exclusively for school purposes and
are mere agencies of the state . . . and that,
as to tort liability, such agencies or authorities occupy a status different from that of
municipal corporations which ordinarily have a
dual character and which may exercise proprietary as well as governmental functions.
It is pertinent to state here that there is a
distinction between municipal corporations
proper
and
quasi-municipal
corporations
concerning liability for torts, and that the
general rule is that the latter is not liable
for torts unless allowed bv statute.
[Quasi-municipal corporations1
are usually
treated as public or state agencies, and their
duties are ordinarily wholly governmental. They
exercise the greater part of their functions as
agencies of the state. . . . On the other hand,
it is recognized that the municipal corporation
proper has functions which are performed by it
not as a mere agent of the state, but in its
capacity as a corporation serving alone* the
local inhabitants.
If the city should be
regarded as a state agency at all times, . . .
there would exist no logical ground for holding
it liable for damages due to negligence, since
in no instance is a state held liable under the
general principles of law.
Id. at 435, 118 Utah at 587-88 (emphasis added, citations and
quotations omitted).
After concluding that the Board of Education was a state
entity, the Court extended absolute immunity to the board, rather
than the partial immunity that is afforded municipalities.
An additional example is found in Hale v. Port of Portland,
783 P.2d 506

(Or. 1989).

The Plaintiff in Hale had filed a

personal injury action against both the Port of Portland (a state
entity) and the County of Multnomah (a municipality) .

12
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When the

trial court limited the defendant's damages to $100,000 pursuant to
a statutory liability cap, the plaintiff appealed, claiming that
the cap violated the "open-courts" provision of the state constitution. Both defendants argued that the "open-courts" provision was
not violated because, at the time the "open-courts" provision was
adopted, government entities were absolutely immune from suit under
the common law.
In deciding the controversy, the Oregon Supreme Court pointed
out that the common law differed with respect to state entities and
municipalities.
immunity

While

at common

state

entities were

granted

law, municipalities were only

"governmental functions."

absolute

immune for

The court thus held that limiting the

liability of the Port (a state entity) did not conflict with the
"open-courts" provision of the state constitution:
Unlike cities, but like other port districts,
the Port is an instrumentality of the state
government, performing state functions.
*

*

*

The Port, being a part of the state's government, therefore is immune from suit to the same
extent the state as such is immune. It follows
that, contrary to the contention of plaintiff
here, [the liability cap] does not deny
plaintiff any right he has against the Port by
virtue of the ["open-courts"] guaranty in Oregon
Constitution Article I, Section 10, because
there never was such a right.
Id. at 511-12.
After upholding the cap with regard to the state entity, the
court addressed the validity of the statute with regard to the
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municipality.

In doing so the court found that municipalities,

unlike state entities, were not absolutely immune from suit at
common law.

Rather, :*t common 1^. municipalities were immune for

"governmental functions," but not for "proprietary functions":
At common law, the state's immunity from suit
extended to municipal corporations only when
they were engaged in so-called "governmental"
functions.
Immunity did not extend to torts
municipal
corporations
committed
w;,ile
performing "proprietary" ~*cts. . . .
Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the statutory
liability cap conflicted with the "open-courts" provision with
regard to the municipality, but not with regard to the state.
Numerous other courts have similarly held that the "governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction applies only to
municipalities, and not to state entities which have always been
absolutely immune from suit.

See State v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184,

186 (Mo. 1985) ("The traditional rule . . . permits the application
of the governmental-proprietary distinction

. . . only as to

municipalities. Any other public entity . . . is in effect an arm
of the state exercising exclusively governmental functions. . .
.");

State v. McHenrv. 687 S.W.2d 178, 181-82 (Mo. 1985)

("The

proprietary-governmental dichotomy applies only in the law of
municipal corporations, and not to activities of the state.");
Green v. Commonwealth, 435 N.E.2d 362, 364 (Mass. App. 1982) ("The
common law . . . did not recognize a proprietary-function exception
to the general rule of sovereign immunity."); Prince George's
14
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County v. B lumber a. 407 A.2d 1151, 1177 (Md. App. 1979)

("In

contrast to the situation with municipal agencies, the distinction
between governmental and proprietary actions has no relevance with
respect to the state or state agencies."); Crowe v. John W. Hartin
Memorial Hosp., 579 S.W.3d 888, 890-91 (Tenn. App. 1979) (while a
state entity is absolutely immune, municipalities can only share in
the state's immunity when they are engaged in a "governmental
function", as opposed to a "proprietary function"); Riddoch v.
State. 123 P. 450, 452 (Wa. 1912) (The "governmental function"/
"proprietary function" distinction applies only to municipalities.
The court knows of no precedent holding otherwise.).

See also

Prosser and Keaton, The Law of Torts, pp. 1043 & 1051 (5th Ed.
1984) (at common law state entities were absolutely immune from
suit

while

governmental

municipalities
activities,

were
as

only

opposed

granted
to

immunity

proprietary

for

ones);

Restatement of Torts, Section 887, Comment c (1939) (Only the state
has complete immunity from tort liability. Municipal corporations
have immunity only for "governmental functions.").
As the preceding authorities demonstrate, state entities have
always been absolutely immune from suit under the common law. The
"governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction applied
only to municipalities.

The University Hospital, as an agent of

the state, was therefore absolutely immune from suit at common law.
Prior to the passage of the UGIA, individuals had no remedy against
the University Hospital.
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2.

In 1965 the State Gave i t s Limited Consent to be Sued by
Adopting the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In 1965 t h e s t a t u t o r y consent needed t o sue t h e s t a t e
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s engaged in "governmental functions")

was

(and

finally

given when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e adopted t h e Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

This Act performs t h r e e t a s k s :
1) F i r s t , t h e Act c o d i f i e s t h e absolute immunity
t h a t was extended t o s t a t e e n t i t i e s and t h e p a r t i a l
immunity t h a t was extended t o m u n i c i p a l i t i e s a t
common law, 1 (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1965));
2) Second, the Act then waives t h e immunity granted
under t h e preceding s e c t i o n for most s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-5 through 63-30-10.5
(1965)); and
3) Third, the Act then l i m i t s t h e l i a b i l i t y of t h e
s t a t e for those a c t i v i t i e s where immunity was waived
under t h e preceding s e c t i o n .
Currently,
the
l i a b i l i t y cap i s s e t a t $250,000 for i n j u r i e s t o a
s i n g l e person (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989)).
The net r e s u l t of t h e s e t h r e e t a s k s i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s now

have a remedy of up t o $250,000 a g a i n s t s t a t e e n t i t i e s (and a l s o
a g a i n s t m u n i c i p a l i t i e s performing "governmental functions") where
no remedy previously e x i s t e d .

I n c r e d i b l y , p l a i n t i f f s are seeking

t o have t h e UGIA declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

If they succeed, t h e

law of governmental immunity w i l l r e v e r t back t o t h e common law and
p l a i n t i f f s w i l l be l e f t without a remedy of any kind.

The comments made on the Senate f l o o r regarding the UGIA c l e a r l y
demonstrate t h a t § 63-30-3 of the Act was intended t o codify common law immunity.
In 1965, when the UGIA was adopted, the courts in many of t h e surrounding s t a t e s
had j u d i c i a l l y abolished the d o c t r i n e of governmental immunity. As a r e s u l t of
t h i s j u d i c i a l waiver, the s t a t e s were completely overwhelmed with l a w s u i t s . The
o r i g i n a l UGIA was intended t o codify t h e common law d o c t r i n e of governmental
immunity in order t o prevent such a j u d i c i a l waiver from occurring i n Utah. As
s t a t e d on the Senate f l o o r , the o r i g i n a l UGIA was intended t o "reaffirm" common
law governmental immunity and then "carve out" various areas in which immunity
would be waived. A t r a n s c r i p t of r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e S e n a t e ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s
are found on pages 9 through 14 of t h e Addendum.
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The difficulties in this case, along with the difficulties in
many previous governmental immunity cases, stem from the manner in
which the legislature performed task "one" (i.e., the manner in
which the legislature codified the common law). In its original
form, the statute performing task "one" read as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act,
all governmental entities shall be immune from
suit for any injury which may result from . . .
the exercise and discharge of a governmental
function.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1965) (emphasis added).
By extending immunity to "governmental functions" this statute
simply codified the common law.

As previously discussed, the

phrase "governmental function" encompasses all activities performed
by a state entity, as well as those activities that a municipality
performs while acting as an agent of the state.

"The legislature

was aware of this and . . . they used their language advisedly. .
. .

It [is] plain enough that the intent of the statute was to

retain the then existing law, both as to immunity and as to
liability. . . ."

Greenhalqh v. Pavson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801

(Utah 1975).
The fact that the legislature did not define "governmental
function" in the UGIA but rather relied upon the common law
definition of that phrase has resulted in extensive litigation.
Over the years the common law definition has gradually been
forgotten.

As a result the courts have been forced to hear many

cases in which the meaning of the phrase was at issue. These cases

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

could have been avoided if the legislature would have set forth the
common law definition of "governmental function" in the UGIA. The
legislature remedied this problem in 1987 by amending the UGIA to
include the common law definition of "governmental function." See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989).

The validity of this 1987

amendment is the central issue in the instant case.
3.

Early Court Decisions Under the UGIA Correctly Recognized
That the "Governmental Function"/"Proprietary Function"
Distinction Applies Only to Municipal Hospitals, and Not
to State Hospitals.

Shortly after the UGIA was adopted this Court applied the Act
to both a state hospital and to a municipal hospital.

Consistent

with the legislative intent and with the common law, this Court
applied

the

"governmental

function"/"proprietary

function"

distinction only to the case involving the municipal hospital. The
distinction was not applied to the state hospital, where this Court
did not even question the fact that the state* hospital was
performing a "governmental function."
In Emerv v. State. 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296 (1971), "the
Utah State Hospital was granted governmental immunity in a case
involving the death of a mental patient, the necessary implication
being that the operation of the facility
governmental function."

in question was a

Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah

1980), citing Emerv v. State. 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296 (1971).
However, in Greenhalqh v. Payson City. 530 P.2d 799 (Utah
1975) this Court applied the "governmental function"/"proprietary
function" distinction to a municipal hospital to determine whether
18
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it qualified for immunity under the UGIA.

The Court correctly

recognized that the phrase "governmental function" does not include
proprietary functions of a municipality:
It is therefore our conclusion that proprietary
functions of a municipality are not within the
coverage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
These cases demonstrate that, even after the adoption of the
UGIA, the "governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction was applied only to municipal hospitals. State hospitals had
always been performing and continued to perform only "governmental
functions."
4.

In 1978 the Legislature Amended the UGIA to Overrule
Greenhalah by Extending Immunity to Municipal Hospitals.

In 1978 the Utah Legislature amended § 63-30-3 of the UGIA.
This

amendment

was

in

"direct

response

to

the

decision

in

Greenhalah" that municipal hospitals are not granted immunity under
the UGIA.

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230, 1238

(Utah 1980).

The 1978 amendment read as follows

(underlined

portions were added by the amendment):
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act,
all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, government a 1 ly-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1978) (emphasis added).
The effect of the 1978 amendment was to extend the state's
immunity

to municipal hospitals, even

if the hospitals were
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performing "proprietary functions."

In such situations, the Act

thus denied individuals of a remedy against a municipal hospital
that had previously existed at common law.
Significantly, the 1978 amendment did not affect the immunity
of state hospitals. State hospitals already qualified for immunity
as "governmental functions" under the UGIA and did not need to be
singled out for a specific grant of immunity.

Nonetheless, after

the 1978 amendment, state hospitals qualified for immunity under
the UGIA as not only a "governmental function," but also as a
"governmentally-owned hospital."
5.

Recent Court Decisions Have Mistakenly
"Governmental
Function"/"Proprietary
distinction to State Hospitals.

Applied the
Function"

The fact that the 1978 amendment extends immunity to state
hospitals as both "governmental functions" and as "governmentally
owned hospitals" has resulted in confusion in the courts.

More

specifically, the amendment has caused the courts to forget that
all

state

entities,

including

state

"governmental functions" as of right.

hospitals,

qualify

as

Instead, the courts have

recently focused on the "governmentally-owned hospital" portion of
the statute that was added in 1978 when determining whether state
hospitals qualify for immunity under the UGIA.
The first government hospital decision interpreting the 1978
amendment was Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

Just like

the instant case, Frank also involved an action for negligence
against the University Medical Center.

The defendants in Frank
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moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the University
Medical Center was immune from suit under the UGIA.

This Court

ultimately concluded that the University Medical Center did in fact
qualify as a "governmental function" under the UGIA, and thus
qualified for limited immunity.

However, in concluding that the

University Medical Center was engaged in a "governmental function"
the Court relied heavily upon the language added in the 1978 amendment.

The Court apparently felt that this new language evidenced

a legislative intent to include the Medical Center within the
definition of "governmental function." The Court did not recognize
that the medical center already qualified as a "governmental
function" as of its own right under the common law principles
previously discussed:
[The 1978 amendment] granted immunity from suit
for injury relating to the public ownership and
operation of a hospital, nursing home, or other
health care facility. . . . [W]e are
disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to
disregard
the
obvious
manifestation
of
legislative intent reflected in the amendment.
For this reason, we hold the operation of a
governmentally-owned health care facility such
as the University Medical Center to be a
"governmental function" as contemplated by the
statute prior to amendment.
Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
While Frank correctly concluded that the University Medical
Center

is

engaged

in

a

"governmental

function,"

the

Court

apparently found it necessary to rely upon the 1978 amendment to
reach such a result rather than simply concluding that the medical
center qualified as a "governmental function" as of its own right.
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To this extent, Frank strayed from the original intent of the UGIA
and also from the common law.
The second case to analyze the immunity of the University
Hospital under the 1978 UGIA was Condemarin v. University Hosp.,
775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). Condemarin is extremely important to the
outcome of this case because, in the trial court, plaintiffs relied
on this opinion to support nearly every aspect of their case.
Condemarin involved an action against the University Hospital
arising from the negligent treatment of the plaintiff's child. The
plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking to have portions of
the UGIA declared unconstitutional.

When the plaintiff's motion

was denied, she appealed to this Court.
On appeal, summary judgment was granted in the plaintiff's
favor and the liability cap contained in the UGIA was declared to
be unconstitutional insofar as it limited the liability of the
University Hospital.

The plurality's holding was based primarily

upon its interpretation of the 1978 amendment to the UGIA.

The

plurality interpreted the 1978 amendment as extending immunity to
the University Hospital as a "governmentally-owned hospital" rather
than as a "governmental function":
The net result of [the 1978 amendment] is that
government-owned health care facilities . . .
have been singled out for . . . immunity for
non-governmental functions.
*

*

*

The legislature did not make the operation of a
health care facility a "governmental function"
as contemplated by the statute. . . . Rather,
22
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the legislature simply added to the category of
government entities covered by § 60-30-3 (i.e.,
those exercising governmental functions) a new
category consisting of government-owned health
care facilities, whether or not those facilities
are exercising governmental or non-governmental
functions. The plain language and structure of
§ 63-30-3 admit of no other construction.
*

*

*

The [governmental immunity] act does not purport
to define the operation of a hospital per se as
the exercise of a governmental function; it only
gives hospitals the same status under the act as
government entities which are performing
governmental functions.
Id. at 350-52 (emphasis in original) . See also Hansen v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 838, 843 n.10 (Utah 1990).
As this language from Condemarin indicates, the plurality was
not aware that the University

Hospital, as a state entity,

qualified for immunity as a "governmental function" and not just as
a "governmentally-owned hospital." If the plurality had been aware
of this fact, it would have, by its own admission, upheld the
validity of the statutory liability limit:
It is true, as defendants argue, that there is
no fundamental right to recover unlimited
damages from government entities performing
governmental functions.
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
However, the plurality

did

not

consider

the

University

Hospital to be a "governmental function" because, after analyzing
the 1978 amendment, it determined that there was "no statutory or
factual basis for such an assumption."

Id.

Thus, the plurality held that the 1978 amendment extended
23
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immunity

to

the

University

Hospital

as

a

"non-governmental

function" rather than as a "governmental function."
The plurality's incorrect belief that state entities were
capable of performing "proprietary functions" at common law led the
plurality to incorrectly assume that the "governmental function"/
"proprietary

function" distinction

applies

to

all

government

entities, and not just to municipalities:
Immunity from liability existed as a matter of
common law in Utah for government entities
engaging in governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, activities.
*

*

*

At common law the proprietary or nongovernmental functions of government entities were not
protected from liability in Utah. . . .
Id. at 349 and 351 (emphasis in original).
Significantly, all of the cases cited in support of this
holding were cases involving municipalities.

See Id. at 350. Not

a single case was cited in which the "governmental function"/
"proprietary function" distinction applied to a state entity.2 As
already demonstrated in detail, such a distinction did not apply to
state

entities

because

state

entities

were

only

capable

of

performing "governmental functions" at common law.
The plurality's misapplication of the "governmental function"/
"proprietary function" distinction to state entities is easy to

2
Those cases cited were: Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180r 89 P.714
(1907); Sehv v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 535, 126 P. 691 (1912); Alder v. Salt
Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 P. 1102 (1924); Rollow v. Oaden City, 66 Utah 475,
243 P. 791 (1926); Niblock v, Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P,2d 800 (1941) •
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understand, in light of the fact that the issue had not been
recognized or briefed by the parties. Rather, the brief submitted
by the University Hospital erroneously assumed that the distinction
applied to state entities:
Under [the] common law there was always
discrimination between a person injured by a
state employee functioning in a government
capacity and one injured by a state employee
functioning in a proprietary capacity. Under
sovereign immunity the person injured in the
governmental function was absolutely barred from
any recovery whereas a complete recovery was
possible as to the proprietary function.
*

*

*

Since government entities were immune from suit
for
government
activities
the
important
distinction as to the liability of the entity
itself was whether the function was proprietary
or governmental.
Brief of University Hospital, pp. 35 & 41.

(Addendum pp. 15-16) .

As illustrated, the defendant in Condemarin misstated to this
Court that the

"governmental

function"/"proprietary

distinction applied to state entities.
to

remedy

this misstatement.

function"

The plaintiff did nothing

Consequently,

this

Court was

erroneously led to believe that the distinction applied to state
entities at common law.
Based upon the incorrect belief that the 1978 amendment
extended immunity to the University Hospital as a "proprietary
function" and that state entities were liable for "proprietary
functions" at common law, the Condemarin plurality held that the
liability cap contained in the 1978 UGIA was unconstitutional. The
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plurality stated that the cap deprived plaintiffs of a common law
remedy against the University Hospital in violation of the "open
courts" provision of the Utah Constitution.

The plurality's

reasoning is set forth below in its own words.
"The right to recover for personal injuries [is] an important
substantive right

[guaranteed by the

'open courts' provision

contained in Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution]." Id.
at 360.

"[The 'open courts' clause provides] that an individual

may not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to
protect basic individual rights." Id. at 357. "The term 'remedy,'
as used in the open courts clause, means the full, fair and
complete remedy provided by the common law."
common

law the proprietary

or

Id. at 372.

non-governmental

"At

functions of

government entities were not protected from liability in Utah. . .
." Id. at 351 (emphasis in original). "Consequently, immunity for
. . . government entities performing non-governmental functions was
created, not retained, by the 1978 amendment.

Such immunity was a

new development." Id. (emphasis in original).

"To the extent that

§ 63-3 0-3 created immunity for employees of government-owned health
care facilities not engaged in governmental functions, it created
immunity where none had existed at common law."

Id. at 3 60.

Under this analysis, the Condemarin plurality determined that
the 1978 UGIA conflicted with the "open courts" provision of the
Utah Constitution. As a result, the plurality subjected the Act to
"heightened scrutiny" under both an equal protection and a due
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process analysis.

The result of the heightened scrutiny was that

the liability cap contained in the 1978 UGIA was found to be
unconstitutional with regard to the University Hospital.
As this discussion demonstrates, Condemarin was based upon an
erroneous assumption that state entities were capable of performing
"proprietary functions" at common law and were liable for torts
arising out of those functions. This erroneous assumption, caused
by inadequate briefing, led the Condemarin plurality to construe
the 1978 amendment as extending immunity to the University Hospital
where none previously existed.

Because the underpinning of the

Condemarin holding was based upon the erroneous assumption urged by
the University Hospital, the decision should be overturned and the
liability cap contained in the UGIA should be upheld as to the
University Hospital.
6.

The 1987 Amendment of the UGIA Corrects the Error Made in
Condemarin and Reinstates the Limited Liability Status of
the University Hospital.

Even if Condemarin is upheld, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment in this case. In 1987 the legislature once again
amended the UGIA. This amendment rectified the concerns raised by
the plurality in Condemarin by demonstrating once and for all that
the University Hospital qualifies for immunity as a "governmental
function," and not as a "non-governmental function" as suggested by
Condemarin.

The amendment made this change by adding the common

law definition of "governmental function" to the UGIA.

This

definition includes all state activities, including the activities
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of the University Hospital, within the definition of "governmental
function":
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act,
failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken in a
dual capacity, essential to or not essential to
a government or governmental function, or could
be performed by private enterprise or private
persons.
*

*

*

(3) "Governmental Entity" means the state and
its political subdivisions as defined in this
chapter.
*

*

*

(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and
includes any office, department, agency,
authority, commission, board, institution,
hospital,
college, university,
or
other
instrumentality of the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (1989) (emphasis added).
This definition of "governmental function" alleviates the
concerns expressed in Condemarin over the fact that immunity was
being extended to a "non-governmental function."

Under the 1987

amendment the University Hospital's activities now qualify for
immunity

as

"governmental

functions."

The

amendment

thus

reinstates the liability limit of $250,000 to the University
Hospital.
By including all state activities within the definition of
"governmental function," the 1987 amendment simply codifies the
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common law, as per the original intent of the UGIA.

It is

difficult to understand how plaintiffs can argue that the 1987
amendment is unconstitutional when the common law has never been
unconstitutional. As shown below, the 1987 UGIA is constitutional
in every respect.
B.

THE 1987 UGIA, WHICH LIMITS THE LIABILITY OF THE UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL TO $250,000, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
1.

The 1987 Amendment is Presumed to be Valid.

When dealing with constitutional issues, the Utah courts have
repeatedly emphasized that statutes carry a strong presumption of
validity:
When we are engaged in statutory construction,
we are obligated to construe statutes when
possible to effectuate the legislative intent
and to avoid potential constitutional conflicts.
It is also a well established rule of statutory
construction that statutes are endowed with a
strong presumption of validity; and should not
be declared unconstitutional if there is any
reasonable basis upon which thev can be found to
come within the constitutional framework.
Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 739 (Utah App. 1991)
(quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added).
This Court has repeatedly stressed that the party attacking
the constitutionality of a statute carries the burden of proof.
See Utah Associated Mun. Power Svs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 789
P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990) (The burden of proof is on those who
would have the Court strike down a statute).

Additionally, "the

challenger must prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a
reasonable doubt."

Sambs v. City of Brookfield. 293 N.W.2d 504,
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511 (Wis. 1980).

See also. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07

(Utah 1974) .
In accordance with these principles, the 1987 UGIA is entitled
to a strong presumption of validity.

This statute must be given

effect until plaintiffs can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the statute is unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs have not even begun to satisfy their burden of
proof in this case. In the trial court defendant Sharp relied upon
two different statutes in support of summary judgment.

The first

statute was the 1987 amendment that is at issue on this appeal.
(See R. 542, 551). This statute constituted the primary argument
advanced by Sharp in support of summary judgment and was also
adopted by defendant Healy.
opposing

memoranda

In spite of this fact, plaintiffs'

completely

failed

to

address

the

constitutionality of the 1987 amendment and instead addressed only
the alternative argument being asserted by defendants.

The only

reference made to the 1987 amendment throughout plaintiffs' entire
opposing memoranda is found in a single-sentence footnote that
summarily concludes that the amendment is "invalid":
The legislature's enactment of § 63-30-2(4) in
1987
purporting
to
define
'governmental
function7 as anything the government does or
doesn't do regardless of whether the act is
"core" or "unique" or "proprietary" is clearly
invalid under the Supreme Court's standard.
Plaintiffs7 Supplemental Memorandum, p. 46 n.4.
This single response is woefully inadequate to overcome the
strong

presumption

of validity

that

attaches
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to

legislative

enactments. Nonetheless, in spite of plaintiffs' complete failure
to address the constitutionality of the 1987 amendment, the trial
court somehow concluded that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional
"for the reasons specified in plaintiffs' memoranda."

(R. 725).

No other explanation was given.
Based upon this fact alone, the trial court clearly erred in
denying defendants' motions for summary judgment.
avoid

summary

In order to

judgment, plaintiffs must prove that the 1987

amendment is unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs have not met their

burden of proof by any stretch of the imagination.
In any event, it is clear that plaintiffs could not satisfy
their burden of proof even if they were to try.
below,

the

liability

limit

contained

in

As demonstrated

the

1987

UGIA

is

constitutional in every respect.
2.

The 1987 UGIA Does Not Violate the "Open Courts" Clause
of the Utah Constitution.

The "open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution found in
Article I, Section 11 provides as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay. . . .
Utah Const, art. I, § 11.
In order to prove that the 1987 UGIA is unconstitutional,
plaintiffs must first prove that the statute conflicts with the
"open courts" clause quoted above.

This is true regardless of

whether plaintiffs attack the statute under an equal protection
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theory, a due process theory, or some other constitutional theory.
Unless the statute violates the "open courts" clause, the statute
will not be subjected to the heightened level of scrutiny necessary
to overturn the statute under any constitutional theory.

See

Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 359 & 373.
Defendants' motions for summary judgment must be granted
because plaintiffs cannot prove that the 1987 UGIA violates the
"open courts" clause. This Court and the courts of virtually every
other state have held that the "open courts" clause only applies to
causes of action that existed when the state constitution was
ratified. When the Utah Constitution was ratified, individuals had
no remedy against state entities whatsoever because of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, as previously discussed.
statutes

codifying

governmental

immunity,

Thus, subsequent

such

as

the

1987

amendment, do not deprive plaintiffs of any remedy because, at
common law, they had no remedy.
As pointed out by this Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d
627 (Utah 1983), Utah's "open courts" clause does not effect the
state's immunity. In Madsen, the plaintiffs filed suit against the
State of Utah and its commissioner of financial institutions. The
trial court found that the action was barred by the 1978 UGIA and
dismissed the case.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that

statutory and common law sovereign immunity deprived them of a
common law remedy

in violation of the "open courts" clause.

However, this Court disagreed and held that the "open courts"

32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

clause has no effect on the state's immunity because, at common
law, individuals had no remedy against the state:
Sovereign immunity — the principle that the
state cannot be sued in its own courts without
its consent — was a well-settled principle of
American common law at the time Utah became a
state.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution, which prescribes that all courts
shall be open and persons shall not be barred
from using them to redress injuries, was not
meant to create a new remedy or a new right of
action•
Consequently, Article I, Section 11
worked no change in the principle of sovereign
immunity, and sovereign immunity is not
unconstitutional under that section.
Id. at 629 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
This principle was further illustrated in Brown v, Wightman,
47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366

(1915).

The plaintiff in Brown was

attempting to bring a wrongful death action.

Because wrongful

death actions did not exist at common law the case was dismissed.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was being denied a remedy
in violation of the "open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution.
This argument was rejected by this Court:
[The "open courts" clause] is a general
provision, which in the same or similar language
will be found in the constitutions of at least
28 states in the union. . . . The courts have,
however, always considered and treated those
provisions, not as creating new rights, or as
giving new remedies where none otherwise are
given, but as placing a limitation upon the
legislature to prevent that branch of the state
government from closing the doors of the courts
against any person who has a legal right which
is enforceable in accordance with some known
remedy.
Where no right of action is given,
however, or no remedy exists, under either the
common law or some statute, those constitutional
provisions create none. . . . The right and
33
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

power, as well as the duty, of creating rights
and to provide remedies, lies with the
legislature, and not with the courts. Courts
can only protect and enforce existing rights,
and they may do that only in accordance with
established and known remedies.
Id. at 366-67, 47 Utah at 34 (emphasis added).
Utah is by no means alone in holding that a state's immunity
is not affected by an "open courts" clause.

Indeed, the vast

majority of states have similarly recognized that, because states
were absolutely immune from suit at common law, statutes that
extend immunity to state entities do not deprive individuals of a
remedy in violation of an "open courts" clause.

One of many

examples is found in Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015
(Kan. 1976).

In Brown a statute reimposing governmental immunity

was challenged under an "open courts" clause similar to Utah's:
All persons, for injuries suffered in person,
reputation or property, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and justice administered without
delay.
Id. at 1023 (quoting Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights).
The plaintiffs claimed that the state governmental immunity statute
denied them a remedy against the government in violation of this
constitutional provision. However, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the governmental immunity statute:
Section 18 [the "open courts" clause] does not
create any new rights, but merely recognizes
long established systems of law existing prior
to the adoption of the constitution. Since the
right to sue the state for torts was a right
denied at common law, such right is not
protected by Section 18. . . .
It seems
unlikely framers of our constitution intended
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Section 18 to abrogate governmental immunity.
Were this true, our early court decisions would
have reached that result. Instead, our prior
decisions uphold governmental immunity.
Id. (emphasis added).
A similar challenge was made in Martinez v. Harris County, 808
S.W.2d 257

(Tex. App. 1991), under a constitutional provision

stating that, "all courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law."

Id. at 261 (quoting Texas

Const., art. I, § 13) . As in Brown, the Martinez court upheld the
constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act:
In order for the open courts analysis to apply,
there must be some abrogation of a litigants
right to bring a cause of action, either common
law or statutory. . . .
*

*

*

[Plaintiff1 did not have a common law cause of
action for suit against Harris County; he only
had a right to sue the county under the Texas
Tort Claims Act. Under the common law doctrine
of sovereign immunity the state and its
political subdivisions . . . may not be held
liable for torts absent a statutory provision
creating such liability. The Texas Tort Claims
Act provides the exception to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for counties.
Thus,
[plaintiff's"j remedy is not rooted in the common
law, but is statutorily created.
Because he
cannot establish he had a cognizable cause of
action that was restricted by rthe statute in
question], he has failed to show a violation of
the open courts provision of the constitution.
Id.

(emphasis added)
Numerous other courts have similarly concluded that "open

courts" provisions do not affect a state's immunity.
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See, e.g. ,

Gasper v, Freidel, 450 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1990) (The "open courts"
clause of the state constitution is not violated when no remedy
existed at common law); Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506,
509-512 (Or. 1989) (sovereign immunity was firmly in place when the
state constitution was ratified; thus a statutory liability cap is
not unconstitutional under "open courts" clause); Morris v. Blake,
552 A. 2d 844 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (No cause of action existed
against the state at common law and thus the "open courts" clause
of the state constitution does not affect the doctrine of sovereign
immunity); Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist., 733 S.W.2d
290 (Tex. App. 1987) (The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
preceded the "open courts" clause of the state constitution and
thus the "open courts" clause does not affect the constitutionality
of governmental immunity statutes); High-Grade Oil Co. . Inc. v.
Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736 (S.D. 1980) (The doctrine of sovereign
immunity predates the constitution and thus the "open courts"
clause of the state constitution has no effect on state statutes
imposing governmental immunity).
As demonstrated, in Utah and in virtually every other state an
"open courts" clause does not effect statutes granting immunity to
state entities because the statutes do not deprive individuals of
a common law remedy.

At common law individuals had no remedy

against state entities whatsoever.

It was not until the UGIA

became effective in 1966 that individuals were granted a remedy
against Utah and its agencies, but even then the remedy has always
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been limited in amount.

The only exception is this Courts

decision in Condemarin, which granted an unlimited remedy because
it was erroneously led to believe that the University Hospital's
activities were "non-governmental functions" and thus subject to
suit at common law. In all other cases, individuals have never had
an unlimited remedy against the University Hospital since the time
of statehood.
It is ironic that plaintiffs are attempting to have the UGIA
declared unconstitutional.

If they succeed, plaintiffs will have

revoked the state's consent to be sued. The state's immunity would
then be governed by the common law, under which the state would not
be subject to any

liability whatsoever.

In such

an event

plaintiffs would have no recovery against the University Hospital,
making their $250,000 settlement more than reasonable.
3.

The 1987 UGIA Does Not Violate Equal Protection or Due
Process.

In order to prove that the 1987 UGIA violates equal protection
or due process, plaintiffs must first prove that the Act violates
the "open courts" clause.

Unless the "open courts" clause is

violated, plaintiffs will not be able to obtain the heightened
level of scrutiny needed to overturn the 1987 UGIA.

Instead, the

Court will apply a "rational basis test," under which "the statute
will surely be found constitutional." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 359
(See all comments in italics).
Because the 1987 UGIA does not violate the "open courts"
clause, as demonstrated, the clause cannot be used indirectly to
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obtain a heightened level of judicial scrutiny under an equal
protection or due process analysis. This was illustrated in Estate
of Caraill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979).
In Caraill the plaintiffs sought several million dollars in
damages from their local government for personal injuries.

The

government claimed that its liability was limited to $50,000 by
statute.

The plaintiffs then filed a declaratory action to

determine the constitutionality of the liability cap.
The plaintiffs claimed that the liability cap violated the
"open courts," equal protection, and due process clauses of the
state constitution.

However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court

disagreed with the plaintiffs on all counts. The court first held
that the statute did not violate the "open courts" clause.

The

court then had to decide how strictly it would scrutinize the
statute under its equal protection and due process analysis.

The

plaintiffs argued that a heightened level of scrutiny should be
applied because the statute conflicted with the "open courts"
clause by inhibiting the right to recover for one's injuries.
However, the court rejected this argument and said:
Where . . . the statute under consideration does
not directly violate part 1, article 14 of our
constitution [the 'open courts' clause], we fail
to see how it could violate the same
constitutional provision indirectly under the
guise of equal protection analysis.
Id. at 707.
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Statutes that limit the liability of government entities are
certainly constitutional, as evidenced by the vast majority of
cases throughout the country. This is true regardless of the form
of the attack. The cases have been so one-sided that an annotation
has recently summarized the opinions as follows:
Courts have almost uniformly recognized that
legislative bodies have the power to prescribe
Tliability] limits, and that the limits
prescribed are constitutionally valid. Though
they may abridge the remedies of victims of
government, as opposed to private torts, damage
limitation statutes or ordinances are almost
unanimously viewed as having a rational basis in
the government's need to provide for effective
risk management. . . . In addition to repelling
equal protection attacks on damage limitation
laws, the courts have also consistently rejected
arguments that such enactments violate due
process,
or
that
they
abridge
state
constitutional guarantees of access to courts
for redress of grievances, or impair vested
rights.
Annot., 43 A.L.R.4th 19, 25 (1986) (emphasis added).
Not surprisingly, nearly all cases involving State Hospitals
and Medical

Centers

have

similarly

liability limits are constitutional.

concluded

that

statutory

A prime example is found in

Sibley v. Board of Superiors, 462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985).

The

plaintiff in Sibley had been transferred from a private hospital to
a University Medical Center.

As a result of her treatment at the

Medical Center the plaintiff suffered massive brain damage, leaving
her with the functional IQ of a 10 year old child. The plaintiff
had a normal life expectancy, but would be unable to take care of
herself. Prior to trial the plaintiff's medical expenses exceeded
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$423,000.

It was expected that a much greater amount would be

required to meet her future long-term needs.
At trial judgment was entered for the plaintiff but the
state's liability was limited to $500,000 pursuant to statute. The
plaintiff

appealed,

claiming

that

the

liability

limit

was

unconstitutional under the "open courts", equal protection, and due
process clauses. In deciding the issue, the court first held that
the statute did not violate the "open courts" clause. As a result,
the court only scrutinized the statute under "the lesser standard
of rational basis [scrutiny]."

Id. at 157.

The court then

concluded that the rational basis test was satisfied and that the
liability cap did not "unconstitutionally violate either the equal
protection

or

due process

constitutions. . . . "

clauses

of

the

state

or

federal

Id. at 158.

Thus, Sibley upheld the statutory liability cap placed on the
University Medical Center.

Other cases involving government

hospitals have produced the same results. See Tarrant County Hosp.
Dist. v. Rav, 712 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App. 1986) (statute limiting
liability of county hospital to $100,000 does not violate equal
protection); Neal v. Donahue. 611 P.2d 1125 (Okla. 1980) (statute
extending

immunity to state hospital does not violate

courts," equal protection, or due process);

"open

Crowe v. Harton

Memorial Hosp.f 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. 1979) (statute limiting
the liability of a government hospital to $20,000 does not violate
"open courts," equal protection, or due process); Fritz v. Regents
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of Univ. of Colorado, 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978) (statute limiting a
person/s ability to sue the University Hospital does not violate
equal protection);

Whitmire v. Jewell. 573 P.2d 573 (Kan. 1977)

(statute extending immunity to University Medical Center does not
violate constitution); Malone v. University of Kansas Medical
Center, 552 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976) (statute extending immunity to
University Medical Center does not violate constitution).
As the preceding
statutes

that

limit

authorities
the

overwhelmingly

liability

constitutional in every respect.

of

state

demonstrate,

hospitals

are

Thus, the 1987 UGIA legally

limited plaintiffs' recovery against the University Hospital to
$250,000.

The trial court erred in ruling otherwise.

C.
THE CONTROL
LEGISLATURE.

OP

GOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY

IS

GIVEN

TO

THE

Virtually every court throughout the country agrees that the
legislature, and not the courts, controls the area of governmental
immunity.

See, e.g., Bailey Serv. & Supply Corp. v. State, 533

P. 2d 882, 883

(Utah 1975)

("Only the

legislature

can waive

sovereign immunity. . . . " ) ; Bingham v. Board of Educ., 118 Utah
582, 589, 223 P.2d 432, 436 (1950) ("If . . . [state agencies] are
to be stripped of immunity, the stripping process should be by
legislative enactment and not by court decree." Similarly, "Under
our constitution the power to make departments of the state respond
in damages for torts rests with the legislature, and without
legislative enactment we are unable to impose any liability or
obligation. . . . "

Id. at 438); Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner &
41
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Smith. Inc.. v. Jacks. 960 F.2d 911, 913 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Only
congress, not the courts, can waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States.

Therefore, in the absence of clear congressional

consent, then, there is no jurisdiction to entertain suits against
the United States."); Alewine v. State. 803 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo.
1991) ("The power to determine whether, and to what extent, the
state is liable to suit is vested in the legislature."); State v.
Peruskov, 800 P.2d 15, 18 (Ariz. App. 1990) ("The . . . legislature
is the only state institution with the power to determine whether
the state shall be subject to suit."); Morris v. Blake. 552 A.2d
844, 850 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Only an act of the general
assembly may waive sovereign immunity."); Stout v. Grand Prairie
Indep. Dist.. 733 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex. App. 1987) ("[The]
determination of the wisdom, justice, necessity or reasonableness
of [governmental immunity] is the duty of the legislature, not the
courts."); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray. 712 S.W.2d 271, 273
(Tex. App. 1986) ("If the doctrine of sovereign immunity ought to
be re-examined and abolished, or further waived, then surely that
would

be the proper

task

of the legislature

and not this

intermediate court."); Rathbun v. Department of Highways. 496 P.2d
937, 938 (Idaho 1972) ("It is clear that . . . immunity [can] be
waived only through express action of the legislature."); Taylor v.
State. 311 P.2d 733, 734 (Nev. 1957) ("It is not within the power
of the courts . . . to strip the sovereign of its armor. . . . It
is the legislature alone which has the power to waive immunity or
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to authorize such waiver.").
Because the control of governmental immunity is given solely
to the legislature, this Court has recognized that a judicial
waiver of the state's immunity violates the separation of powers
clause contained in Utah Const., art. V § 1:
To [waive the state's immunity] would do
violence to our concept of separation of powers,
we believe. We have left to the constitution
and legislature the matter of waiver of immunity
in such cases.
* * *

We must not judicially legislate, but must, in
our tri-partite form of government, leave to the
legislature whether there should be a waiver of
immunity. . . .
Cobia v. Rov City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 377-78, 366 P.2d 986, 988
(1961) . See also State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 71, 368 P.2d 585,
589 (1962) ("any drainage of tax payers' funds by abolition of the
doctrine [of sovereign immunity], is the subject of legislative
attention in our tri-partite system of government, —

not the

court's.") (J. Henroid, rebutting the dissenting opinion).
As evidenced above, the control of governmental immunity is
unquestionably vested in the legislature. Only the legislature has
the power to waive the state's

immunity.

The trial court

encroached upon the legislature's power when it overturned the 1987
UGIA and completely waived the University Hospital's immunity.
Thus, the trial court's ruling should be reversed and defendants'
motion for summary judgment should be granted.
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D.

THE LEGISLATURE HAS POWER TO REIMPOSE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
AFTER IT HAS BEEN ABROGATED BY THE COURTS.
Because

governmental

immunity

is

controlled

by

the

legislature, courts uniformly agree that the legislature has the
power to reimpose governmental immunity after it has been abrogated
by the courts.

One recent example is Randall v. Fairmount City

Police Dep't., 412 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1991).
In Randall the plaintiff filed suit against a government
entity.
act.

The suit was dismissed under the governmental immunity

On appeal, the plaintiff pointed out that prior judicial

decisions had abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity.
Although this immunity had been reinstated by the legislature, the
plaintiff

claimed

that

the

statute

reimposing

immunity

was

unconstitutional because it deprived her of a remedy in violation
of the "open courts" clause of the state constitution.

The West

Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the
validity of the statute reimposing governmental immunity:
Our holding is supported by almost all of the
authorities elsewhere. Virtually every reported
case involving a "certain remedy" challenge to
the broad, legislative reinstatement of local
governmental tort immunity, after judicial
abrogation of such immunity originating at
common law, has rejected that challenge. . . .
Consistent with the great weight of authority,
we hold that the . . . provisions . . . do not
violate the certain remedy provision of . . .
the constitution of West Virginia.
Id. at 744-45 (emphasis added) (citing Hardin v. City of Devalls
Bluff, 508 S.W.2d 559 (Ark. 1974); Sadler v. New Castle County, 524
A.2d 18, 25 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987), aff'd, 565 A.2d 917, 923-24
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(Del. 1989); Davis v. Chicago Hous. Auth. , 555 N.E. 2d 343, 345-46
(111. 1990); Adams v. City of Peoria, 396 N.E.2d 572, 574-75 (111.
App. 1979); Carroll v. County of York. 437 A.2d 394, 396 (Pa.
1981); Robson v. Penn Hills School Dist.. 437 A.2d 1273, 1276-77
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist.,
733 S.W.2d 290, 293-95, 296-97 (Tex. App. 1987), writ of error
ref d (no reversible error) (Tex. Oct. 7, 1987), cert, denied., 485
U.S. 907 (1988); Brown v. Wichita State Univ.. 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan.
1976); Bruce v. Wichita State Univ.. 429 U.S. 806 (1976); Cords v.
State, 214 N.W. 2d 405, 410 (Wis. 1974)).
Consistent with this majority rule, the courts have routinely
held

that

legislatures

can

re-extend

immunity

to University

Hospitals and Medical Centers after the courts have taken it away.
In Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado. 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978) ,
the plaintiff sued the state for injuries she sustained as a
patient in a state hospital.

The defendants were granted summary

judgment and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that a portion of the
state's governmental immunity act was unconstitutional.

However,

the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the statute.
court

explained

that

the

legislature

had

validly

The

reinstated

governmental immunity:
The General Assembly restored governmental
immunities in part by its enactment of the
Governmental Immunity Act. . . . In doing so,
it had full authority to specify what actions
may be brought against the State and its
subdivisions.
Id. at 25-26.

See also Whitmire v. Jewell. 573 P.2d 573 (Kan.
45
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1977) (statute re-extending immunity to University Medical Center
is constitutional); Malone v. Univ. of Kansas Medical Center, 552
P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976) (statute reimposing immunity of University
Medical Center does not violate constitution).
As demonstrated above, the Utah legislature clearly has the
ability to reinstate the immunity of the University Hospital by
including the hospital's activities within the definition of
"governmental function." This power was already recognized by this
Court in Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Prior to Frank, this Court had held that at least some
government-owned hospitals were capable of performing "proprietary
functions" within the meaning of the original UGIA. See Greenhalah
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).

As a result, the Utah

Legislature amended the UGIA in 1978 to extend immunity to all
government entities engaged in "the exercise of a governmental
function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other
governmental health care facility."

Frank, 613 P. 2d at 519

(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3 (1978)).
After scrutinizing the 1978 amendment, this Court found that
the amendment was intended to reinstate immunity to governmentowned hospitals by including the hospitals within the definition of
"governmental function." Significantly, this Court recognized the
legislature's right to pass such an amendment and upheld the
apparent reinstatement of immunity to the government hospitals:
[W]e are disinclined, as a matter of judicial
policy, to disregard the obvious manifestation
46
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of legislative intent reflected in the [1978]
amendment.
For this reason, we hold the
operation of a governmentally-owned health care
facility such as the University Medical Center
to be a "governmental function" as contemplated
by the statute. . . .
Id. at 519.
Frank thus illustrates a very important principle; namely,
that this Court will characterize the activities of the University
Hospital as "governmental functions" when it perceives that the
legislature
Although

intended

other

court

the activities
opinions

have

to

be

so

characterized.

reinterpreted

the

1978

amendment, this Court has recognized that Frank remains controlling
for the principle cited herein.

See Hansen v. Salt Lake County,

794 P.2d 838, 843 n.10 (Utah 1990).
The Condemarin opinion itself reflects this Court's deference
to the legislature on governmental immunity issues.

Indeed, the

plurality's opinion was premised upon the perceived legislative
intent of the 1978 amendment to extend immunity to the University
Hospital

as

a

"non-governmental

function"

rather

than

as a

"governmental function." Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 351-52. Now, the
recent 1987 amendment shows that the legislature's intent is
exactly the opposite and that the activities of the University
Hospital are intended to be "governmental functions."
should

adhere to this more recent expression

of

This Court
intent and

acknowledge that the activities of the University Hospital are in
fact "governmental functions." This is the same situation that was
previously presented to this Court in Frank, wherein this Court
47
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abandoned prior precedent and allowed the legislature to include
the activities of the University Hospital within the definition of
"governmental function."

Frank, standing alone, thus provides

ample precedent for reversing the trial court.
CONCLUSION
In Condemarin, a plurality of this Court concluded that the
1978 UGIA was unconstitutional insofar as it limited the liability
of the University Hospital.

This decision was based on an

erroneous assumption that, at common law, state hospitals were
capable of performing "proprietary functions" and were subject to
suit. This erroneous assumption led the plurality to construe the
1978 amendment as extending immunity to the University Hospital's
activities as "non-governmental functions" in violation of the
"open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution.

Because of its

erroneous

overturned

underpinnings, Condemarin

should

be

and

defendants' motions for summary judgment should be granted.
Even if Condemarin is upheld, defendants are still entitled to
summary judgment.

Since the cause of action in Condemarin arose

the Utah Legislature has amended the UGIA to include the activities
of the University Hospital within the definition of "governmental
function."

This amendment alleviates the concerns raised in

Condemarin and once again limits the liability of the University
Hospital to $250,000. Plaintiffs received $250,000 under the terms
of their settlement agreement, thus obtaining the maximum recovery
from the University Hospital allowed by law.
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To avoid summary judgment plaintiffs must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the 1987 UGIA is unconstitutional.

In order

to prove the Act unconstitutional, plaintiffs must first prove that
the Act deprives them of a common law remedy in violation of the
"open courts" clause. Plaintiffs cannot meet this burden of proof
because no common law remedy existed against the state.

The Utah

Governmental

limiting

plaintiffs7
$250,000.

Immunity
claim

Act

against

thus

remains

applicable,

the

University

Medical

Center

to

Plaintiffs received this full amount, rendering their

settlement reasonable as a matter of law.
In light of these facts, defendant Roger Sharp respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his
summary judgment motion and to order the trial court to enter
summary judgment in
DATED this

day of^^U^3^f.

, 1992.

Glenn C. Manni

BY (AT)(^$

f(. fuQ&fr^

David R. Nielson
Attorneys for Defendant
Roger T. Sharp

103999bc
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
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U T A H CODE
ANNOTATED
CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
63-30-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent
contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1;
1983, ch. 129, $ 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions of this section and renumbered the subsections accordingly, added present Subsection (4), and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
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63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.—Except as may
be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3.

(Original

63-30-3.

—

1965)

Immunity of governmental entities from suit.

Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities [-shaH-bej are immune form suit for any injury which Imey-pesuk-fewn
-t-he-aefctvkiea-of -satd-eftt-kies-whepem -sekt-eftfcky- *s -engaged-m -khe -exercise
^ndniieehai^e-ef^-^evei^fnental--kmetioH results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility.

(1978 amendment)

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other n a t u r a l disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27,
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in
ch. 93, § 1.
the second paragraph.

(Controlling statute)
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63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental entity
or employee.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
HIPWELL, SHELLY
PLAINTIFF
VS
SHARP, ROGER T
HEALY, TIM W

CASE NUMBER 910905017 CV
DATE 03/30/92
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND AFTER HAVING HEARD ORAL
ARGUMENT ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
COURT HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT, RULES AS
FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DENIED,
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION
THERETO.
2. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.
3. THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS PIVOTAL AND DISPOSITIVE.
THIS COURT WOULD URGE DEFENDANTS TO PURSUE AN INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THEIR MOTIONS.
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq. (#5718)
GARY RHYS JOHNSON, Esq. (#5729)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SHELLY HIPWELL, an
individual by and through
her guardians, SHERRY
JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vsROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY,
and DOES I through X,

Civil No. 910905017 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

The Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Roger T.
Sharp and Tim W. Healy came on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled court on March 30, 1992 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
Defendant Sharp appeared by and through his counsel of record,
Glenn C. Hanni and Strong & Hanni and Defendant Healy appeared
by and through his counsel of record, Thomas L. Kay of Snell &
Wilmer.

Plaintiff

appeared

by

and

through

her
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counsel

of

•:.-•;ji

record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell and Simon
Forgette.
The court, having

reviewed

the respective motions,

supporting and opposing memoranda, having heard oral argument,
and being fully apprised in this matter,
HEREBY ORDERS that the Motions for Summary Judgment are
hereby denied.
DATED this

Iffi^day

of~Mefrc*r> 1992,
BY'THE COURT:

JV DENNIS FREDERICK
CT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:
STRAWS* ST HANNI

Glenn C. Hanni
Attorneys for Defendant Sharp
SNELL & WILMER

Attorneys for Defendant Healy

JJ hipweti\order3
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Regular May Term, 1992
Shelly Hipwell, an individual
by and through her guardians,
Sherrie Jensen and Shayne
Hipwell,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Roger Sharp, Tim W. Healy,
and Does I through X,
Defendants and Appellants.

June 23, 1992

No. 920218
910905017CV

Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal having
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal
be, and the same is, granted as prayed.
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Senate Debate on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
January 18, 1965
Senator Welch (introducing the bill):
Now, I'd like to, I'd like to very briefly, uh, explain to you
the experience that has occurred in our neighboring states.

And

this is one of the reasons why, in my opinion, it is very important
that we act upon this bill.
About a year, about two years ago now, the Supreme Court of
the State of California, by a court order in response to a, a case,
a specific case brought before that court, just by a court rule and
court order abolished —

completely abolished —

governmental

immunity in that state, within overnight practically, that state
was besieged with millions of dollars worth of suits and claims
against the State of California and its entities. This matter was
of such great importance to the people of the State of California
that a, that a special session of the legislature of the State of
California was
moratorium

on

called.

And

suits against

California or its entities.

that
the

special

session

government of the

passed

a

State of

And this moratorium was for a year's

time, until such time as they could make a study and come back with
recommendations to the legislature.
They did come back and they did make recommendations and they
did pass a bill.

They passed a series of bills, a very complex

series of bills. We have, we have had the benefit of those bills.
We have studied them.

00004231
1182.361

That those bills in that state, uh, that

1
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legislature, set out immunity by statute in the State of California
and as we go along you'll find out that's exactly what we've done.
They set up immunity by statute and then out of the immunity the
State of California, through its legislative process, carved out
certain areas in which an action might be brought by the citizens
of that state against the government of the State of California or
its entities or subdivisions.

This is a matter of controlling, to

a certain extent, rather than leaving the thing wide open.
I would like to also emphasize that about a year ago in the
State of Arizona the Supreme Court did exactly the same thing. And
I could read you that decision if you like, I have it here, but I'm
not going to bore you with it.
said this:

But the supreme court in essence

The rule of governmental immunity is a rule that has

been set up and adopted by the courts.

It is not a statutory

creature and therefore it can be abolished by the courts and we
therefore abolish statutory or I mean governmental immunity from
suit in our state.
I was on a panel with the assistant director of uh, the
legislative council of the State of Arizona.

This was about two

months ago over in the State of Wyoming at the Western Conference
of the Council of State Governments.

I was uh, chairman of the

panel in connection with governmental immunity and I have there, on
the panel with me, this man from Arizona. We also had a professor
from the State of California whose is largely responsible for the,
for the research and work that went into the California act. This

00004231
1182 - 361
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man from Arizona said immediately upon the, upon the, uh, abolition
or striking out and, uh, overruling of governmental immunity in
their state by this court order, that they were beset by Six
Million Dollars worth of suits.
working

and planning

California did.

to

And they are very anxiously

solve the problem

such as the way

And I have provided them with materials which we

have, which we have uh, been able to develop in this state.
Now, this isn't all.

About six months ago the court of the

State of Nevada did exactly the same thing.

Now I want to merely

point out to you, what I!m trying to point out to you and trying to
get over to you is the fact that a court order or a court decision
which completely waives

and does

away with

the

doctrine of

governmental immunity then throws the doors wide open to all and
every kind of suit that might be brought.

And I'd like to, to

state that, that our approach to this matter has been to take a
middle of the road course. To open the door for those people where
there's obvious uh, serious handicap to the individual who has been
injured, but not to leave it open, that door wide open so that it
will

be

detrimental

to

the

interest

of

the

state

and

its

subdivisions.
Tape No. 2, Lines 8.3 to 14.5.
* * *

Now I'd like to, after going through that general, general
discussion, I'd like to just, just briefly run through some of the
provisions of this bill and I'll appreciate it if you'll turn to

00004231
1182.361
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the bill.

It's Senate Bill 4, Senate Bill 4 in your file there.

Now if you'll note the first part of this bill just has to do with
definitions and I don't think we'll need to spend any time on that.
Section 2, if you'll read it, reaffirms for this state the doctrine
of governmental immunity.

It does it by statute.

We do not have

governmental immunity by statute in the State of Utah.

We have

governmental immunity only by reason of having the court having
said so. And therefore the court could waive it if it wanted to.
So we reaffirm in this statute, in this bill, the doctrine of
governmental immunity, Section 2. I'm, I'muh, I think I'm wrong.
Section 3.

Section 3.

It says "Except as may be otherwise

provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for any injury which may result from the activity of said
entity wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge
of a governmental function." Now, we reaffirm that and then later
on we carve out of that immunity various areas.
Tape 2, Line 24 to 26.
* * *

I have uh, uh, about gone through this bill uh, gentlemen. I
want to assure you that, that in my opinion this is a necessary
bill.

I think that it will not hurt the State of Utah or its

subdivisions. I think that it will be helpful because I think that
uh, we have just as much a possibility of the court, the courts
taking this matter into their hands and determining that there is,
that there should be a doing away with this doctrine.

00004231
1182.361
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A-12

I'm not

going to foretell when and how, but it has happened in the
surrounding states and I think that this, this approach that we
have seen is the reasonable approach. It is not, it is not opening
the door all the way, and Ifve said this about three times and I
want to emphasize it, it is not opening the door all the way to
allowing suits of every kind against the state and its entities.
It opens it part-way.

But this part-way opening does protect the

citizens of our state.
Tape 3, Line 20 to 22.

00004231
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an

d

of $100,000 placed upon him wniie a person who is injured
by a similar governmental employee also performing a "nonessential" function has no limit.
31-32)•

(Appellants' Brief, pp.

Respondents would dispute that the University of

Utah Medical Center is a •'non-essentialn function of government especially to these persons like Mrs. Condemarin whose
very life may depend on it.
fail for two reasons.

In any event, this argument must

First, under common law there was

always discrimination between a person injured by a state
employee functioning in a government capacity and one injured
by a state employee functioning in a proprietary capacity.
Under soverign immunity the person injured in the governmental
function was absolutely barred from any recovery whereas a
complete recovery was possible as to the proprietary function.
Again, however, this inequality does not give rise to a
constitutional claim since its roots were developed long before
any constitutions were written.
Second, while this section is inapplicable to this
case, the new revised code Section 6 3-30-35 piaces a financial
limit of $250,000 recovery for one person or $500,000 for two
or more persons regardless of whether the tort feasor was acting
in a governmental or non-governmental capacity.

Under this

new statute Appellants1 assumption that an unlimited recovery
can be obtained for a person injured in a non-governmental
function is simply incorrect.

The distinction between govern-

mental and proprietary functions has totally been abandoned
in the new Governmental Immunity Act "to escape the inevitable
-35-
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?h<2 rule of 'the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed
has no application to the statutes of this ytate.
The statutes establish the laws of this state
respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
whenever there is any variance between the rules
of equity and the rules of common law in reference
to the same matters the rules of equity shall prevail.
As noted by one Pennsylvania court:
[A] person has no property, no vested right,
in any rule of common law. . «, . [T]he law itself,
as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will,
or even the whim, of the Legislature, unless prevented
by constitutional limitations. The great office of
statutes i^ to remedy defects in the common law as
they are developed and to adapt it to changes of time
and circumstances. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.. 113
(1877). Kobson v. Penn Hills Softool District, 437
A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) .
The original scheme of liability for government entities
and employees evolved on a case by case basis.

Since government

entities were immune from suit for government activities the
important distinction as to the liability of the entity itself
was whether the function was proprietary or governmental.
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
On the other hand, as to a governmental employee the question
was whether that employee was acting in a discretionary or
ministerial capacity.

As noted by this Court:

A governmental agent performing a discretionary
function is immune from suit for injury arising therefrom, whereas an employee acting in a ministerial
capacity, even though his acts may involve some
decision makinc, is not so protected. Frank v. State,
613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980).
It would serve no useful purpose to list the numerous
cases decided by this Court involving government employees.
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